What you will be able to do
- Explain why a managed setting holds when project files, user files and --settings JSON try to change it
- Choose a delivery mechanism for managed policy based on how your fleet is run
- Pick an MCP control pattern, from a fixed server set to an approved catalog, and predict which servers load
- Route all Claude Code model traffic through a company gateway and export telemetry to your own collector using managed env values
- Limit shared skills, agents, hooks and MCP servers to vetted plugin marketplaces
Key concept
Managed settings — Policy that an organization delivers to every Claude Code installation from the admin console, MDM, or a system-level file. It sits above project, user, local and command-line settings, so a developer cannot override any key it sets.
1.Managed settings: the tier developers cannot override
A security rule that lives in a repository only holds while nobody changes the repository. Suppose .claude/settings.json is committed with a deny on Read(./.env*). One engineer edits the file in their clone. Another starts a session with their own --settings JSON, and command-line settings override project and user files for that session. Neither person broke anything. Both used the settings stack exactly as designed. A rule that has to hold needs to sit in the one tier that stack never overrides, which is managed settings.
Managed settings are policy your organization deploys, and they rank above every developer-controlled source. Nothing in a user's settings files or --settings JSON overrides a managed key. A flag such as --model can only choose from the models the organization allows. Agent SDK sessions load managed settings even when settingSources excludes the user, project and local files, so a headless script can't skip policy by narrowing its sources.
{
"permissions": {
"deny": [
"Read(./.env)",
"Read(./secrets/**)"
],
"disableBypassPermissionsMode": "disable"
},
"allowManagedPermissionRulesOnly": true
}That file does three jobs. The deny list blocks the reads. disableBypassPermissionsMode removes --dangerously-skip-permissions. allowManagedPermissionRulesOnly makes managed settings the only source of permission rules, so an allow rule a developer adds locally has no effect. The weaker fixes fail for the same structural reason. A nightly script that rewrites ~/.claude/settings.json still writes to a tier that --settings outranks. A CODEOWNERS rule protects the shared branch but not a developer's clone. A managed CLAUDE.md is behavioural guidance for Claude, not a rule the client enforces.
How the policy reaches machines depends on how the fleet is run, and each mechanism picks up changes on its own schedule:
| Mechanism | Delivered through | When Claude Code reads it | Use it when |
|---|---|---|---|
| Server-managed | claude.ai admin console or a self-hosted Claude apps gateway | Fetched at startup and polled hourly | You want one place to change policy without touching each machine |
| MDM / OS policy | macOS com.anthropic.claudecode profile or HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\ClaudeCode via Jamf, Intune, Group Policy | At startup, checked every 30 minutes | You already manage devices with MDM or Group Policy |
| File-based | managed-settings.json in /etc/claude-code/, /Library/Application Support/ClaudeCode/, or C:\Program Files\ClaudeCode\ | At startup, reloaded when the file changes | Machines without MDM, Linux hosts, images you build yourself |
| HKCU registry | HKCU\SOFTWARE\Policies\ClaudeCode | Only when no admin document is present above it | You can't write the machine-level HKLM key |
Deploying more than one of these causes a common surprise. The sources rank in the order of the table, highest first: server-managed settings, then MDM or OS-level policy, then the managed-settings file, then the HKCU registry. The first three are admin sources. HKCU is user-writable, so Claude Code reads it only when no admin document sits above it. Under the default managedSourcesBehavior of "first-wins", Claude Code uses the highest-ranked source that delivers at least one policy key and ignores the rest, apart from a short list of keys it reads from every admin source. It shows no warning about the skipped sources. Only /status names the source it used and the ones it skipped. To combine sources, set "merge". With merge, lists union, locks take the strictest value, and on most other keys the higher-ranked source wins. Cloud sessions are a separate case. A session in an Anthropic-hosted environment doesn't read a device's MDM profile or file, so its policy must come from server-managed settings.
Checkpoint 1 of 9· Fill the gap
This managed-settings.json is meant to make sure that an allow rule a developer adds to their own settings has no effect. Which key completes it?
{
"permissions": {
"deny": [
"Read(./.env)",
"Read(./secrets/**)"
],
"disableBypassPermissionsMode": "disable"
},
" ? ": true
}allowManagedPermissionRulesOnly makes managed settings the only source of permission rules, so allow rules from user, project, local or --settings sources are ignored. The deny list blocks the reads, and disableBypassPermissionsMode removes --dangerously-skip-permissions.
Source: code.claude.comCheckpoint 2 of 9· Check yourself
An organization has no server-managed settings. It deploys a macOS MDM profile that denies Read(./secrets/**) and also a managed-settings.json that denies Read(./.env). It leaves managedSourcesBehavior unset. What does Claude Code enforce on a Mac that has both?
The default managedSourcesBehavior is "first-wins". Claude Code applies the highest-ranked source that delivers a policy key, which here is the MDM profile, and ignores the file. It gives no warning, and only /status shows which sources were skipped. Lists are unioned only when managedSourcesBehavior is set to "merge".
“Claude Code uses the highest-ranked source that delivers at least one policy key and ignores the rest rather than merging them”Source: code.claude.com
Checkpoint 3 of 9· Exam question
Kestrel Energy runs a grid-balancing platform, and its 300 engineers use Claude Code across dozens of repositories. Security committed a .claude/settings.json to every repository that denies Read(./.env*) and Bash(curl *). A quarterly audit still found engineers reading .env files that hold production credentials. Investigators traced it to two patterns: some engineers edited the file in their local clones and never pushed the change, and others start sessions with their own --settings JSON on the command line. Engineers have full control of their own home directories, and laptops are company-managed. Auditors will accept only a control that holds on every machine whatever an engineer edits, passes at launch, or sets in personal files, and that blocks the tool calls themselves rather than asking the agent to behave. What is the most direct way to make the deny rules hold?
Correct answer: B — Deploy the deny rules in managed-settings.json through MDM or server-managed settings, which Claude Code applies ahead of project, local and --settings values.
- A. Review rules and branch protection only govern what is merged to the shared branch. Edits made in a local clone and
--settingsJSON passed at launch never go through a pull request, so the bypasses in the audit remain open. - B. Managed settings sit above the command-line, local project, shared project and user levels, and engineers cannot edit or override them. Deny rules delivered through MDM or the server-managed channel therefore hold on each machine whatever the engineer changes or passes at launch.
- C. The user-level file is owned by the engineer, who can edit or delete it, and a nightly restore leaves gaps between runs. It is also the lowest-precedence level, so it is not a control the organization can rely on to enforce the rules.
- D. A CLAUDE.md file, even in the managed policy location, is context the model weighs rather than an enforced control. It does not block a Read or Bash tool call the way a permission deny rule does, so it cannot guarantee that secrets stay unread.
2.Controlling which MCP servers sessions can load
MCP servers are the riskiest thing a developer can add on their own. A single claude mcp add or a line in a project .mcp.json can give the agent write access to a ticketing system or a production database. A rule asking Claude to decline unknown servers leaves the server loaded. A nightly audit only finds it after the fact. Managed MCP configuration works earlier: a server that fails policy never loads. Organizations choose from a range of patterns, from no MCP at all to no restrictions. The production lifecycle of the servers themselves is covered in production MCP and change management.
| Pattern | Effect | Configure |
|---|---|---|
| Disable MCP | No servers load except the exempt ones described below | managed-mcp.json with an empty server map |
| Fixed deployment | Everyone gets your servers; servers users configure don't load | managed-mcp.json with the servers you want |
| Provided servers | Everyone gets your remote servers and keeps their own | managedMcpServers in managed settings |
| Approved catalog | Users add approved servers they want; anything else is blocked | allowedMcpServers + allowManagedMcpServersOnly: true |
| Soft allowlist | Allowlist that users can broaden in their own settings | allowedMcpServers without allowManagedMcpServersOnly |
| Denylist only | Block known-bad servers, allow everything else | deniedMcpServers |
Even the strictest pattern leaves a few servers loaded, because they come from the organization or the host application rather than from the user. They are the servers defined in managed-mcp.json, the servers you provide through managedMcpServers, in-process servers that the app which started the session registers (the VS Code extension's own server, or the connectors the desktop app delivers), the server Claude Code creates when a mod adds tools, and the built-in Claude in Chrome server when you allow it alongside the managed set. So an empty server map in managed-mcp.json leaves only these, and an empty allowedMcpServers array blocks every user-added server while these remain.
The approved catalog is usually the right answer when users have added unvetted servers. It needs two keys working together. allowedMcpServers lists what is permitted. allowManagedMcpServersOnly: true makes the managed list the only one that counts. Without that lock, allowedMcpServers is a soft allowlist that any user can extend. Entries match on serverUrl (wildcards allowed), on serverCommand (the exact command and every argument, in order), or on serverName (exact match only). An empty allowedMcpServers array allows no user-added servers, only the exempt ones described above. Leaving the key unset allows every server.
{
"allowManagedMcpServersOnly": true,
"allowedMcpServers": [
{ "serverUrl": "https://api.githubcopilot.com/*" },
{ "serverUrl": "https://*.internal.example.com/*" }
]
}deniedMcpServers merges in from every source and also applies to managed servers, so a user can block a server for themselves but can't add one the policy rejects. Users see the policy as concrete errors. claude mcp add for an unlisted server fails with not allowed by enterprise policy, and a server that is already configured but now blocked disappears from /mcp and claude mcp list. One deployment detail matters: managed-mcp.json takes exclusive control and can only be delivered as a file on the device, never through server-managed settings.
Checkpoint 4 of 9· Match them up
Match each managed MCP configuration to the effect it has on developers' sessions.
Tap a term, then the definition that fits it.
The allowManagedMcpServersOnly lock makes the managed allowlist the only one that counts. Without it, allowedMcpServers is a soft allowlist that users can extend. managedMcpServers adds servers without restricting anything. managed-mcp.json takes exclusive control, and a denylist on its own blocks only the servers it matches.
“Enforce an allowlist that users can broaden in their own settings | allowedMcpServers without allowManagedMcpServersOnly”Source: code.claude.com
Checkpoint 5 of 9· Exam question
Marlow Analytics runs its production revenue-reporting platform from company-managed laptops and a shared repository. Security finds that engineers have added an unvetted community MCP server with write access to the company ticketing system, declared in a project .mcp.json and through claude mcp add. On some machines the server exists only in an engineer's personal configuration, with no repository change at all. A written instruction telling Claude to use only approved integrations was already loaded, yet logs show the server connected and its write tools were called. Tickets were modified before anyone noticed, and Security requires that an unvetted server never connect at all. Security also requires a control that holds however a server is declared and that engineers cannot alter from their own or repository configuration. Which control most directly limits every session to the vetted servers?
Correct answer: C — Set an allowlist of approved servers and a denylist of known-bad ones in managed settings, so unlisted servers fail to load from user, project or local scope.
- A. Code review covers only servers declared in the repository file. Engineers also add servers at user and local scope with
claude mcp add, which never touches the repo, so the unvetted server still gets in that way. - B. A CLAUDE.md file is context the model reads, not an enforcement layer. The unvetted server still connects and exposes its write tools, and refusal depends on the model following the instruction, which is not a reliable control.
- C. Allowlist and denylist entries in managed settings are enforced by the client and cannot be overridden from user, project or local configuration. A server that is not approved does not load, however it was declared.
- D. A nightly audit is detective, not preventive. The unvetted server stays connected with write access to the ticketing system until someone acts on the ticket, so sessions in the meantime are not limited to vetted servers.
Sources3
3.Routing all model traffic through a company gateway
Finance and data-loss-prevention teams often need every model request to pass through one company LLM gateway. Two settings route Claude Code there. ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL sends API requests to the gateway instead of api.anthropic.com. A credential then authenticates each request, either apiKeyHelper, which runs a command to fetch the key, or a static ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN or ANTHROPIC_API_KEY. How those credentials are issued and rotated belongs to identity and secrets management.
Where the values are set decides whether they hold. A shell profile export or a committed project env block can be overridden by the developer, in the same way as the .env deny rule in the first section. Put the base URL and the helper in the managed env block and they become a managed key that user files and --settings cannot change. Two more managed controls narrow the remaining paths. allowedProviders lists which API providers a machine may use. A provider is the kind of endpoint a session talks to: anthropic (Anthropic's own API through a claude.ai or Console sign-in or an API key), bedrock, vertex, foundry, customEndpoint (the API sent to another host, such as an LLM gateway named by ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL), and gateway (a Cloud gateway sign-in). A session on an unlisted provider is refused at startup, at login, and when it next contacts the API, so a developer can't skip the gateway by signing in to Anthropic directly or switching to a cloud account. customEndpoint is admitted only for the exact URL a managed env block pins. The "gateway" value of forceLoginMethod sends people to a Cloud gateway sign-in instead of a first-party login. Under it, sessions authenticated by ANTHROPIC_API_KEY, ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN or apiKeyHelper are blocked at startup, and so is an API key saved by an earlier Console login, because a personal credential would otherwise stand in for the required sign-in. Monthly spend reconciliation and usage reports only show a bypass after it has happened. Only enforcement prevents it.
Pointing at a gateway changes where policy comes from, and it depends on which kind of gateway the fleet uses. A Claude apps gateway is a self-hosted gateway that developers sign in to with /login. It can deliver their policy, so Claude Code still fetches remote settings through it. A third-party LLM gateway, such as LiteLLM, Kong or an internal proxy, is reached by setting ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL and supplying a key. It carries model requests, and when ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL points at it Claude Code skips the remote source and starts at the next one. If developers authenticate through a gateway sign-in screen, the fleet is in the first case. If they send a key from apiKeyHelper or an environment variable to a base URL, it is in the second, and its policy needs to be delivered by MDM or a managed file.
Checkpoint 6 of 9· Check yourself
A company's only managed policy is set in the claude.ai admin console. It now sets ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL on every machine to point at a third-party LLM gateway. What happens to that policy?
Claude Code fetches remote settings from claude.ai only for eligible direct Anthropic credentials or a gateway sign-in through /login. When ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL points at a third-party gateway, Claude Code skips that source and starts at the next one, so the fleet needs its policy delivered by MDM or a managed-settings file.
“On other providers, or when ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL points somewhere other than Anthropic’s API, it starts at the next source”Source: code.claude.com
Checkpoint 7 of 9· Exam question
Nettle Bank runs its payments platform on Claude Code across roughly 300 engineers on managed laptops. Finance requires all model traffic to flow through the company LLM gateway for spend attribution and DLP. A quarterly audit found that several engineers still use personal API keys directly against the Anthropic API, both in interactive sessions and in scripts that call the SDK. Some of those sessions ran in repositories that already carry gateway settings, and others ran in scratch directories outside any company repository. Security has stated that detecting this bypass after the fact is not sufficient, because DLP inspection is skipped for every call that avoids the gateway. Which approach most directly closes that path?
Correct answer: D — Deploy the gateway base URL and credential helper in managed settings, and block the Anthropic API hostname at the corporate proxy except from the gateway.
- A. Virtual keys and invoice comparison only reveal bypass after the spend has happened. Engineers holding personal keys can still call the Anthropic API directly, so the path stays open and is merely detected.
- B. A profile snippet only sets a default that engineers can unset or override, and it does not affect scripts or SDK calls made with a personal key. The monthly report discovers bypass long after the traffic left.
- C. Repository settings only cover projects that adopt the file, and a user or local settings file can override them. Code owner review does not stop sessions outside those repos or direct calls with a personal key.
- D. Managed settings make the gateway the configured route on managed machines and cannot be overridden by users. The proxy rule blocks direct calls with personal keys, so the gateway is the only working path.
4.Enterprise telemetry: your collector versus Anthropic-bound traffic
Telemetry needs two separate decisions. The first is whether to export OpenTelemetry metrics and logs to your own collector, so you can see adoption and spend. The second is whether Claude Code may send Anthropic-bound usage metrics, error reports and surveys. Both are set through environment variables, and both belong in managed env so individual machines can't drift. What to do with the signals once they arrive is the subject of telemetry and instrumentation.
{
"env": {
"CLAUDE_CODE_ENABLE_TELEMETRY": "1",
"OTEL_METRICS_EXPORTER": "otlp",
"OTEL_LOGS_EXPORTER": "otlp",
"OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_PROTOCOL": "grpc",
"OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_ENDPOINT": "http://collector.example.com:4317",
"OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_HEADERS": "Authorization=Bearer example-token"
}
}Setting the endpoint centrally also closes a gap. When managed settings set OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_ENDPOINT, Claude Code removes every per-signal endpoint a developer has set, so nobody can send one signal to a different collector. The Anthropic-bound direction is the opposite switch, and two variables with different reach control it. DISABLE_TELEMETRY set to "1" in a managed env block is the telemetry opt-out: it stops telemetry going to Anthropic and leaves the rest of Claude Code's network behaviour alone. CLAUDE_CODE_DISABLE_NONESSENTIAL_TRAFFIC is the broad switch. It turns off all nonessential network traffic, which includes auto-updates, telemetry, error reporting, the /feedback command, release notes and feature-flag fetching, and with feature flags gone, Remote Control becomes unavailable. Any non-empty value triggers it, even 0 or false. Choose DISABLE_TELEMETRY when the goal is only to stop telemetry. Choose the broad variable when the network must be quiet, and plan another update path, since auto-updates stop too.
Checkpoint 8 of 9· Fill the gap
Your organization wants Claude Code to stop sending telemetry to Anthropic on every machine. It does not want to change anything about exporting data to its own OpenTelemetry collector. Which environment variable completes this managed env block?
{
"env": {
" ? ": "1"
}
}Telemetry involves two separate switches. Setting DISABLE_TELEMETRY to "1" in a managed env block turns off Anthropic-bound telemetry for the whole organization. CLAUDE_CODE_ENABLE_TELEMETRY and the OTEL_* variables control the other direction: exporting metrics and logs to your own collector.
Source: code.claude.com5.A quality bar for shared skills, agents and MCP servers
Once teams start sharing skills, subagents, hooks, slash commands and MCP servers, the governance question is which channel shared content may arrive through. Plugin marketplaces are the reviewable channel. A marketplace is a git repository or URL that the organization curates, so whatever review process you require happens before content is published there. Managed settings then make that marketplace the only way in.
{
"strictKnownMarketplaces": [
{ "source": "github", "repo": "acme-corp/approved-plugins" },
{ "source": "github", "repo": "acme-corp/security-tools", "ref": "v2.0" },
{ "source": "url", "url": "https://plugins.example.com/marketplace.json" }
]
}Pinning a ref such as v2.0 means users install the version that was reviewed, not whatever is on the default branch. An empty strictKnownMarketplaces array blocks every marketplace, including Anthropic's official one, so the allowlist must contain the sources you actually want. Several other managed keys stop vetted content from being bypassed:
strictPluginOnlyCustomizationblocks skills, agents, hooks and MCP servers from user and project sources.truelocks all four, and an array names which ones.blockedMarketplaceslists sources that are checked before download, so they never reach the filesystem.disableSideloadFlagsrejects--plugin-dir,--plugin-url,--agentsand--mcp-configat startup, which closes the one-run sideload.allowManagedHooksOnlyrestricts which hooks run, andallowedHttpHookUrlsrestricts where HTTP hooks can send data.syncClaudeAiSkillsandsyncClaudeAiPluginsset tofalsestop skills and plugins that developers enabled on claude.ai from loading in Claude Code.pluginTrustMessageadds your own text to the trust warning shown before a plugin installs.
Checkpoint 9 of 9· Match them up
Your organization reviews shared content before it publishes it to a curated marketplace. Developers must not be able to get around that review. Match each managed key to the gap it closes.
Tap a term, then the definition that fits it.
Each key closes a different route around the reviewed marketplace. strictKnownMarketplaces sets which marketplaces are allowed, and blockedMarketplaces rejects named sources before download. strictPluginOnlyCustomization shuts out user and project customizations. disableSideloadFlags blocks one-run CLI sideloading, and the sync keys stop content enabled on claude.ai from loading.
“Block skills, agents, hooks, and MCP servers from user and project sources; true locks all four, an array names which”Source: code.claude.com
Practise it for real
Deploy an approved MCP catalog as a managed file on a Linux test machine and confirm that Claude Code enforces it.
1.Write the approved-catalog JSON (allowManagedMcpServersOnly plus allowedMcpServers) to /etc/claude-code/managed-settings.json.
Why: The file-based mechanism is read at startup and reloaded when the file changes, so you need no MDM to test it.
You should see: The file exists in the system directory and only an administrator can write to it.
2.Start Claude Code and run /status.
Why: /status names the managed source in use and any it skipped, which is how you catch a first-wins surprise.
You should see: The setting sources list the managed settings file.
3.Run claude mcp add --transport http test https://example.com/mcp
Why: The policy check rejects the command before any server is contacted, so the URL doesn't need to be real.
You should see: Cannot add MCP server "test": not allowed by enterprise policy
4.Run claude mcp list.
Why: Servers that were configured earlier but now fail policy should no longer appear.
You should see: Only servers that match the allowlist are listed.
Stuck? Get a nudge
If a user's unapproved servers still appear, check the file path and the permissions on its parent directories before you change the policy.
Sources
(9)
Every claim above is drawn from one of these pages, quoted as it was written on the date shown.
- 1.https://code.claude.com/docs/en/settingsOfficial docs
“Nothing in your own settings files or --settings overrides a managed key”
↩︎ Managed settings: the tier developers cannot override“A key you set there overrides the same key in your project and user settings files”
↩︎ Managed settings: the tier developers cannot override“Nothing in your own settings files or --settings overrides a managed key”
↩︎ Key concept - 2.https://code.claude.com/docs/en/managed-settingsOfficial docs
“Agent SDK sessions load managed settings even when settingSources excludes the user, project, and local files.”
↩︎ Managed settings: the tier developers cannot override“Makes managed settings the only settings source of permission rules.”
↩︎ Managed settings: the tier developers cannot override“Claude Code shows no warning for the sources it skips; /status names the source it used and the ones it skipped.”
↩︎ Managed settings: the tier developers cannot override“Admin source: one of the first three sources below. The HKCU registry is user-writable and isn’t one.”
↩︎ Managed settings: the tier developers cannot override“On other providers, or when ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL points somewhere other than Anthropic’s API, it starts at the next source”
↩︎ Routing all model traffic through a company gateway“"DISABLE_TELEMETRY": "1"”
↩︎ Enterprise telemetry: your collector versus Anthropic-bound traffic“Block skills, agents, hooks, and MCP servers from user and project sources; true locks all four, an array names which”
↩︎ A quality bar for shared skills, agents and MCP servers“Reject the --plugin-dir, --plugin-url, --agents, and --mcp-config flags at startup.”
↩︎ A quality bar for shared skills, agents and MCP servers“Claude Code uses the highest-ranked source that delivers at least one policy key and ignores the rest rather than merging them”
↩︎ Exam trap 2“Enforced as an empty allowlist until the value is fixed, so no marketplace source is admitted.”
↩︎ Exam trap 4“Claude Code uses the highest-ranked source that delivers at least one policy key and ignores the rest rather than merging them”
↩︎ Checkpoint - 3.https://code.claude.com/docs/en/managed-mcpOfficial docs
“Publish a list of approved servers; users add the ones they want, anything else is blocked”
↩︎ Controlling which MCP servers sessions can load“deniedMcpServers applies to managed servers too, so a managed server that matches an entry won’t load.”
↩︎ Controlling which MCP servers sessions can load“Cannot be set through server-managed settings”
↩︎ Controlling which MCP servers sessions can load“In-process servers that the app that started the session registers, such as the VS Code extension’s own server”
↩︎ Controlling which MCP servers sessions can load“Enforce an allowlist that users can broaden in their own settings”
↩︎ Exam trap 3“Blocked: matches both, but the denylist takes precedence”
↩︎ Prediction“Enforce an allowlist that users can broaden in their own settings | allowedMcpServers without allowManagedMcpServersOnly”
↩︎ Checkpoint - 4.https://code.claude.com/docs/en/llm-gateway-rolloutOfficial docs
“Sends Claude Code’s API requests to the gateway instead of api.anthropic.com”
↩︎ Routing all model traffic through a company gateway“Authenticates each request to the gateway. The helper runs a command to fetch the key”
↩︎ Routing all model traffic through a company gateway - 5.https://code.claude.com/docs/en/admin-setupOfficial docs
“A session on a provider that isn’t listed is refused at startup, at login, and when it next contacts the API.”
↩︎ Routing all model traffic through a company gateway“Turn off Anthropic-bound usage metrics, error reports, and surveys on every device”
↩︎ Enterprise telemetry: your collector versus Anthropic-bound traffic“Organization-wide behavioral guidance for Claude rather than a client-enforced rule”
↩︎ Exam trap 1 - 6.https://code.claude.com/docs/en/settings-referenceOfficial docs
“Claude Code admits it only for the exact value a managed env block pins”
↩︎ Routing all model traffic through a company gateway“Claude Code sends people to a cloud gateway instead of a first-party login”
↩︎ Routing all model traffic through a company gateway“An empty array is a complete lockdown that blocks every marketplace source, including the official Anthropic marketplace”
↩︎ A quality bar for shared skills, agents and MCP servers - 7.https://code.claude.com/docs/en/authenticationOfficial docs
“under forceLoginMethod the credential would stand in for the required sign-in.”
↩︎ Routing all model traffic through a company gateway - 8.https://code.claude.com/docs/en/env-varsOfficial docs
“when ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL points at an Anthropic-compatible gateway such as LiteLLM, Kong, or an internal proxy”
↩︎ Routing all model traffic through a company gateway“disable nonessential network traffic: auto-updates, telemetry, error reporting, the /feedback command, Claude-drafted feedback, release notes”
↩︎ Enterprise telemetry: your collector versus Anthropic-bound traffic - 9.https://code.claude.com/docs/en/monitoring-usageOfficial docs
“Developers can’t point one signal at a different collector”
↩︎ Enterprise telemetry: your collector versus Anthropic-bound traffic